Strategic Delegation and Delay
No matter what the arrangement is, as long as there is an employer and employee relationship, the basic areas such as wages, benefits, profit-sharing, and annual raise will have to be adjusted based on what takes place in a given industry. This means that if the given industry pays a certain average pay, every company that is in that industry would be required to pay similar wages according to a calculating method that is already in place and failure to do so will entitle the union to call a strike.
If there is not settlement after the strike there will be an arbitration that will decide whether the company has to pay the amount declared standard by the barraging position the unions take. What this demonstrates is if the arbitration cannot settle the case it will to go to court where the final verdict will be available. This shows that being fair to labor had become part of doing a socially responsible business in any given society, to the point where those who fail to adhere to such requirements will find it difficult to carry out regular business.
There are tactics employers are using that resulted in their accusation involving cases that are lighter in nature that could take a long time on the negotiation table to reach an agreement with the hope that the other side will give up, mostly the union (Conlin and Fursawa, 2000). The reality is if the negotiation fails, there is arbitration that should get the desired result. When that is not the case, the courts might be the final resort where if the grievance is well grounded it could cost the employers dearly.
Because of that, employers for the most part treat labor negotiations fairly because they make enough profit to do so and things could take wrong turns only if the situation is out of everyone’s control as discussed earlier due to the effect of globalization, the introduction of new technology, and when economies fail.
Conlin, M. and Furusawa, T. , (2000). “Strategic Delegation and Delay in Negotiations over the Bargaining Agenda. ” Journal of Labor Economics, Curhan, Jared R.; Elfenbein, Hillary Anger and Xu, Heng, 2005 “What Do People Value when They Negotiate? Mapping the Domain of Subjective Value in Negotiation,” Working Paper, MIT. Boston. Human Rights Watch, “Unfair Advantage: Workers’ Freedom of Association in the United States Under International Human Rights Standards,” 2000. Kate Bronfenbrenner, “Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages and Union Organizing,” U. S. Trade Deficit Review Commission, 2000. McDonald, Ian M. and Solow, Robert M. , (1981). “Wage Bargaining and Employment. ” American Economic Review,