Answer # 1
In the instant case, the legal issue before us for consideration is whether BetterGrass has a cause of action or right to sue against any party, and if so, against whom and on what grounds.
In the instant case, BetterGrass had approached the District and QA describing themselves as competitors of TurfGrass, but promising to have better and much more inexpensive products. However, for some reason, District and QA refused to consider it at all.
A right to sue or cause of action is a bundle of facts which gives rise to a remedy in law for a particular act of the defendant. In the instant case, a private bid for a private contract was being carried out, the final authority of which rested with the District and QA. Even if they erroneously didn’t consider the proposal of BetterGrass, it does not give latter the right to sue them as this was awarding of a private contract with terms and conditions set by the District and QA. Even assuming BetterGrass’ bid was lower; District and QA can always argue that they had every right to not award it to someone else as no auction was being conducted and no bids invited.
If BetterGrass sues SiteK, the latter would argue that it simply had no choice in the matter. As per the contract between District & QA and SiteK, the latter was bound to use the services of TurfGrass. Therefore, SiteK is is no way responsible for BetterGrass’ rejection.
In the instant case, the legal issue before us is whether BestFields has a right to sue, and if so whom, and for what remedy, i.e. an injunction, or damages.
BestFields had participated in the bid and bid the lowest amount. However, its bid was rejected owing to poor track record and past litigations with the District. QA, in its investigations found these reports to be correct.
BestFields can argue that the District has called for bids and therefore proper procedure must be followed. Proper procedure here would imply that the lowest most bid should be selected. If there are any disqualifications with respect to a particular bidder, then these must be declared by the tender holder in advance. Therefore, BestFields bid should be accepted, failing which, it should be given compensatory damage.
The District may argue that a bid process represents nothing more than an invitation to offer. Once a bidder has submitted even the lowest bid, its merely an offer which needs to be accepted by the tender holder so as to constitute a legally binding contract. In this case, although BestFields made the most attractive offer in monetary terms, it was rejected on other grounds, which have been shown to be true and valid.
If BestFields sues QA, the latter can argue that it was simply doing the job that the District asked it to do. Since the property still vests in the District, QA was obligated to heed to whatever the District said.
In the instant case, the legal issue before us is the claims and defenses of SiteK and TurfGrass.
The factual matrix here is such that while SiteK was awarded the contract, it didn’t get the possession of land in time due to which the project was delayed. In the meantime, prices of all raw materials, and most importantly, the artificial turf had gone up considerably.
TurfGrass may argue that prices of artificial turfs are a volatile figure, subject to market conditions and risks. Further, the price quoted by TurfGrass was as on the date of the quotation, and the same was liable to change depending upon the market conditions. TurfGrass should, therefore, pray for relief that SiteK be asked to buy the artificial turf at the prevailing price or the former be compensated to the extent of its business losses and opportunity cost.
SiteK may argue that while it had agreed to bear all the risks reasonably associated with the project, it had not undertaken unforeseeable risks. It was unforeseeable to presume that the supplier of the turf would be a litigious matter. The QA was expected to have resolved this matter, since it had categorically asked SiteK to purchase the turf from a particular seller. It is this litigation which caused the unreasonable day, which in turn, caused the prices to sharply rise and therefore making it economically unviable for SiteK to carry out the project. SiteK should claim that the difference in the increased turf prices should be paid by QA.
In the instant case, the legal issue before us is whether SiteK can make a claim for extra costs, and if so, against who, and what are the defenses available to the District and QA in case of such a claim.
SiteK may argue that it informed the QA at the first instance, without any unreasonable delay, when it failed to remedy the situation. QA itself acknowledged that it was difficult to make out from the pictures provided by it, and even after providing an improved version, many extra costs had to be incurred. SiteK may also argue that the terms and conditions in the contract which exonerate the District and QA for all liabilities towards extra costs and unqualified and therefore unfair contract terms which cannot be given effect to in law.
SiteK may also make a claim against the District as it failed to inform SiteK about the extent of debris on the site. Again, SiteK may argue that terms and conditions exonerating District from liability are unfair contract terms and should be held void. Also, there is no contract between SiteK and District which exonerates the latter’s liability towards the former. Under common law, the District had a duty to inform SiteK of the nature of site once its job was done.
The District may argue that it has expressly stated in the agreement that it shall bear no risk or extra cost and in no way be responsible for them if the site debris has concrete or is unexpectedly tough.
QA may argue that it has clearly stated in its agreement with SiteK that all claims towards extra costs must be made at a stage much before the present one.
In the instant case, the legal issue before us is whether TurfGrass can sue SiteK and if it does, who shall prevail and on what grounds.
SiteK may argue that its actions are supported by the terms and conditions of its contract with TurfGrass.
TurfGrass, on the other hand, may argue that this is an unfair term in the contract and hence has no value in the eyes of law. It may further argue that the intent behind having such a provision was to ensure that if TurfGrass failed to deliver its goods on time, due to which SiteK suffered a loss or had to pay damages, the burden could fall upon TurfGrass. However, in the instant case, TurfGrass did its job well before the stipulated time and the damages paid by SiteK were due to a reason for which TurfGrass was not responsible in any way whatsoever.
TurfGrass may claim its whole amount from SiteK on grounds and reasons discussed above.
If TurfGrass sued SiteK, it is likely TurfGrass would succeed in getting its payment. However, SiteK may sue the District on grounds of getting the possession of the site much later than reasonably expected. Therefore, it is submitted that the SiteK is not liable to pay any liquidated damages to the District.
SiteK should move the court to join the District as a part of the suit if TurfGrass sues SiteK so as to ensure that even if it is called to pay the amount to TurfGrass, they recover the amount from the District.
In the instant case, the legal issue before us is whether anyone is liable to compensate a person injured on the turf in the football field, and if so, which party is liable to pay.
Under the contract, the District and QA have put all liability on the Contractor who must indemnify them against all losses. However, the Contractor, in turn, has agreed with the supplier that the supplier shall indemnify him against all losses. The supplier is also to maintain an insurance of 5 million.
Therefore, the distinguished alum may sue all the parties involved here viz. the District, QA, Contractor and the supplier. Out of these parties, the supplier would be liable to pay the damages and his insurer would step in as this happened within one year of supplying of the turf. However, if the supplier can show that there was no defect with the turf per se but with its manner of installation, then the contractor would be liable to pay compensation.
If the Contractor being at fault refuses to pay the compensation on the grounds that the agreement between him and the supplier provides otherwise, the supplier can move the court and argue that the term contained in the agreement is not intended to be construed in such a manner, and if construed in a manner, it would amount to an unfair term, which would have no value in the eyes of the law.