How did European integration and economics
The decades of the sass’s and ass’s were undoubtedly geared towards a period of economic integration within European nations. Integration was inevitably triggered by the geopolitical and economic considerations that emerged after the Second World War for the European states. A restrained Germany alongside US and French interest in economic progression through increased trade links are the key factors behind why European integration occurred. The Treaty of Rome would predominantly bring on European integration in 1957, which established the European Economic Community (SEC).
This would progressively come into force through the elimination of tariffs by 19681. The SEC would progress economically in these decades through the formation of the SEC customs union, increased trade between SEC and FETA (European Financial Trade Association) members. Though the competition brought about by the SEC increased economic performance in the ass’s, the Luxembourg Compromise and the resignation of De Gaulle alongside British accession into the SEC led to economic stagnation and a period of ‘Recoilless’2 in the sass’s.
The formation of the SEC introduced a revolutionary component for European economic integration. Whilst the Organization for the European Economic Community (EEOC) enabled nations to liberalize on a non-discriminatory basis, the SEC removed all trade barriers on a
Need essay sample on "How did European integration and economics"? We will write a custom essay sample specifically for you for only $ 13.90/page
In 1961, the I-J applied for SEC membership. This event highlighted the shift in the ass’s towards the overwhelming economic benefits European integration via the SEC. I-J industries faced the reality of rising Judgment against them in an even larger racket. Britain’s decision to Join the SEC had a knock on effect for other European Free Trade Association (FETA) members, who quickly followed Britain’s move. This gradual movement over the late ass’s culminated in the 1973 SEC enlargement, which in turn shrunk FETA markets.
FETA governments then pushed their governments to redress the situation, where bilateral free trade agreements (Fats) between remaining FETA members and the SEC, which was undertaken when the I-J and How did European integration and economic performance interact in the ass’s and ass’s? By Jacobean integration had a positive effect on economic performance; as to become the increasing threat of competition and promise of more markets to sell into was a strong driving force for innovation throughout Europe.
Although the customs union was a swiftly completed factor for European economic performance, integration stagnated soon after it had been completed. The Community was taken aback by a variety of political crises in the sass, which was then followed by economic shocks which amounted to the ‘Recoilless’ of the ass’s. De Gazelle’s Luxembourg compromise forced unanimity amongst SEC members on session making, which significantly staggered economic integration within Europe. De Gaulle, who had always supported supranational in European integration, challenged the premise in 1966.
This test arose when France opposed a range of Commission proposals, which included the means for financing the Common Agricultural Policy. This reversed much of the unlimited supranational that the Six committed themselves to in the Treaty of Rome Just ten years before. In the late sass and early sass Ernest Mandela and Chris Herman provided a critical evaluation of the process of European integration from a Marxist point of view. Mandela believed that the power embedded within supranational institutions depended on the degree of interpenetration of capital in Europe.
This points out the Commission’s weakness at the time, and that this was a sign of the very early stage Europeanization of capital was still at. Herman goes on to identify three separate predispositions of capital focus. The first he believes takes place at a national level, second at the regional level and a third at the international level. Herman predicted “if the existing state provides too narrow a base for the activities of capitals, there will serially be an attempt to widen that base by alliances and mergers with other states.
Therefore, in the long run the trend towards regional blocs is likely to be the predominate one”6. Indeed, during the sass and sass “the tendency was for the concentration of capital to take place within national state structures, with the assistance of national states”. 7 But this changed once the crisis of the mid-sass hit the European economies and triggered in the long run a far-reaching process of restructuring. The number of European mergers increased significantly.
Into the sass’s, two incremental changes took place. The first was the break down of the Breton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, which was seem as the critical factor supporting the rapid post-war growth in trade and investment and the rising economic prosperity these brought. This prevented nations from offsetting the market-opening effects of European integration with a competitive devaluation. The second factor was the return of capitalist crisis, starting with the recession of 1974-75.
Both had the potential to undo much of what had been achieved during the previous two decades. The risk that European economies would drift apart was amplified. It could also create huge problems for all those firms that were now operating across the borders of the member states and needed stability in exchange rates to plan their operations. Similarly, the recession of 1974-75 led to a host of managed to forge a common strategy. There was a first attempt at monetary coordination in 1972, called the “snake”, but this foundered in following years.
A second attempt followed in 1979 with the European Monetary System (EMUS) and the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). This time the arrangements were more favorable to weak currencies. 0 This was designed both to win the support of the Cultists in France, now led by Jacques Circa, who opposed the austerity needed to establish the Franc’s participation in the ERM, and to protect the Deutsche from further revaluation against a hastily depreciating dollar. 1 The failure of the “snake” also allowed the French to argue that the Germans had to shoulder part of the burden of adjustment if they wanted European integration to move forward. This debate about the contours of European monetary cooperation and the balance it should achieve between the interests of weak and strong currencies is a constant eater of European integration since the sass. However the sass’s should be credited for developing the European communists economic performance in many ways.
The European Court of Justice ‘generated an impressive body of case law 12 and gave the SEC overall direction in adjusting to the international and economic turmoil that was unraveling at the time. The CE] would allow the SEC to grow through the ‘inexorable extension of Community law. ’13 In summary European integration underwent massive wholesale changes in the sass’s that amounted to the regions economic performance getting dramatically deter as a result, but did not go far enough to ensure a lasting framework for economic stability in the region.